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Collective Bargaining In Perspective
Bernard Kleiman*
This paper, prepared pursuant to the invitation of the editorial
staff of the Duquesne Law Review is in response to an article by Mr.
R. Heath Larry entitled: Inflation, Labor and the Law.' As the title
of Mr. Larry's article suggests, it is a broad-ranging presentation,
touching upon many facets of labor law, legislative history and
socio-economic policy. Notwithstanding the interesting and inform-
ative excursions into other areas, Mr. Larry's primary topic is the
American system of determining wages, hours and working condi-
tions through collective bargaining. The result of his efforts is a very
critical assessment of the collective bargaining system.
Collective bargaining is a complex, unstructured, ever-changing
process which defies characterization. Because of its amorphous
nature, collective bargaining is perceived differently depending
upon one's vantage point. This gives rise to disparate assessments
of its function and efficacy. Hence, Mr. Larry has undertaken a
formidable and perilous task. How can one fairly assess something
that is so elusive? How can such an undertaking be meaningful
when the reader or critic is very likely to have a totally different
perception of the process? Obviously, it becomes a matter of
perspective.
Mr. Larry and I have very different labor relations orientations.
He is a management spokesman; I am a labor attorney. It will,
therefore, come as no surprise that I will disagree with most of Mr.
Larry's premises and conclusions.
We have, on the other hand, for a number of years shared the
common experience of participating in labor negotiations between
the American steel industry and the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica. This has been a constructive, innovative and productive collec-
tive bargaining relationship.' By reason of our mutual exposure to
* Bernard Kleiman is a partner in Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, a Chicago, Illinois
law firm, and is General Counsel to the United Steelworkers of America.
1. Larry, Inflation, Labor and the Law, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 203 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Larry].
2. ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, PROCEEDINGS 66 (1973).
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this bargaining relationship, Mr. Larry and I share certain percep-
tions. First, there is the obvious fact that we have a similar view of
the form and function of collective bargaining. Secondly, we know
that the process can work well in a given industry over a long period
of time.
Because of these areas of concurrence, I was somewhat surprised
to find that the major thrust of Mr. Larry's article is that the pre-
vailing collective bargaining system should be revamped. Though
Mr. Larry ultimately concludes that this is not the time to press for
an overhaul of collective bargaining, he clearly does not endorse the
system.
This paper will examine Mr. Larry's criticisms of the collective
bargaining process and analyze his proposals for change.
I. THE PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT TO CONTEMPLATE "ECONOMIC"
EMERGENCIES
Sections 206-210 of the Labor-Management Relations Act were
enacted in 1947.1 They provide for a mandatory 80 day cooling-off
period and other procedures in connection with any strike or threat-
ened strike which "affects an entire industry or a substantial part
thereof . . . and . . . if permitted to occur or to continue, will im-
peril the national health or safety . . . .
Mr. Larry suggests that either Congress or the courts should now
act to expand the language or interpretation of these provisions to
encompass "economic emergencies." ' This would mean that when-
ever an "economic emergency" is alleged, the President and Attor-
ney General of the United States would be entitled and perhaps
obliged to attempt to enjoin a strike which is in progress or, worse,
one which is merely threatened.' One can envision the possibility
that under such a system the executive and judicial branches of
government would become active participants in support of man-
agement and in opposition to workers in numerous labor disputes.
3. Labor-Management Relations Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, §§ 206-10, 61 Stat. 155
(currently codified, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as
the Taft-Hartley Act].
4. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1970).
5. Larry, supra note 1, at 214.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1970).
Vol. 13: 481
Collective Bargaining in Perspective
The extent of such governmental intrusion would, of course, de-
pend upon what the President and the judiciary would deem to be
an "economic emergency." After first insisting that national secu-
rity is now threatened on an economic front, Mr. Larry responds to
the issue of how much economic distress must exist before the na-
tional health and safety is imperiled as follows:
Recent trends in international and domestic economic events
may now call for a different approach, because our national
"security" is threatened in ways which were only dimly per-
ceived, if at all, during the forties and fifties ...
. . . The contest still goes on. The principal socialist econ-
omy still boasts that it will bury us. . . . [I]t still clings to
its stated mission of outdoing and destroying our "capitalist
bourgeois economy," by winning . . . on the field of contest
over economic and social progress.
National survival, however, is no less at stake than during
an armed conflict. . . . [T]his kind of contest will be continu-
ous, rather than intermittent, as were 'traditional' forms of
battle. Thus, a sound economy, with minimal inflation, has
become an ultimate necessity from the standpoint of national
security.7
If I understand Mr. Larry correctly, he is asserting that the
United States is presently under an unremitting state of economic
siege, that the survival of our nation, or at least our economic and
political system, is imperiled and that the "national health or
safety" is now dependent upon "minimal inflation." From this, I
conclude that under Mr. Larry's proposal a strike or threatened
strike would be enjoinable whenever the nation is experiencing
greater than "minimal inflation" or there is a determination that a
strike might cause such a condition.
The implications of such a theory are profound and disturbing,
for it is totally alien to our current system of collective bargaining.
A. Our National Labor Law Policy Was Developed to Eliminate
the Sort of Judicial and Governmental Interference That this
Proposal Would Evoke.
It is evident that the effect of Mr. Larry's "economic emergency"
7. Larry, supra note 1, at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
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theory would be to bring the federal government and the federal
courts into many collective bargaining situations. Under the banner
of fighting "inflation," the force and the resources of government
would be mobilized in support of management. Government would
be actively opposing the legitimate interests of workers. Under the
national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act such govern-
mental intervention would serve a two-fold purpose-(1) to enjoin
or prevent a strike and (2) to limit the size of the wage and benefit
package obtained by the workers.
Mr. Larry concedes that this is the thrust of his proposal:
The nation can no longer continue to absorb the impact of
major settlements which embody a significant inflationary
bias. Nor can it continue to absorb the impact of strikes which
enforce inflationary demands and which interrupt the opera-
tions of a major segment of our interrelated economy for any
period of time ....
[T]he shape of our law does not now point the way to viable
solutions for this problem. Possibly this is because we have
previously conceived of national emergencies in quite a differ-
ent context.'
There is a fundamental reason why our law does not accomplish
what Mr. Larry seeks. During the 1930's Congress acted to rescue
workers from governmental and judicial suppression. For many it
will be an old refrain, but when collective bargaining is under as-
sault, it is always helpful to review the circumstances that led to the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act' and the Wagner Act. 0
Let us look back to the situation in which the labor movement
found itself just prior to the turn of the century. We find writers who
believed that all strikes were illegal, and that workers who acted
together to improve their condition had as their purpose to inspire
"if not actual fear, at least solicitude or apprehension in the mind
of the bravest man, and in the timid actual fear and indescribable
dread.""I And throughout the writings ran the strong thread of polit-
ical philosophy that employees, massed together, should not be per-
8. Id. at 213-14.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
11. COGLEY, STRIKES, LOCKOUTS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 223 (1894),
From the definitions given, all strikes are illegal. The wit of man could not devise a
Vol. 13: 481
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mitted to persuade an employer to do that which he would have
refused if dealing with his employees one to one." That philosophy,
of course, became translated into the common law, where combina-
tions of workers to quit their employ, for whatever reason, were
treated as criminal conspiracies. 3
In the same year that these principles were being enunciated, they
were being applied in what is perhaps the most famous strike in
history. In May, 1894, the Pullman Company cut its employees'
wages by twenty percent. The Amercian Railway Union, which rep-
resented the Pullman employees, struck Pullman. The strike soon
spread throughout the railway system. The Attorney General of the
United States swiftly sought and obtained an injunction barring all
strike conduct. Criminal contempt proceedings followed, and Eu-
gene V. Debs was sentenced to prison for six months. Despite Debs'
resistance, the strike was lost."
As indicated by Frankfurter and Greene in their remarkable trea-
tise which led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
legal one. Because compulsion is the leading idea of a strike. Men seek to compel by
force of numbers, employers or employes to do that which they well know could not
be done by single individuals. It is apparent to any sane mind that there is something
in the mere assembling together in large numbers, that inspires if not actual fear, at
least solicitude or apprehension in the mind of the bravest man, and in the timid actual
fear and indescribable dread. The purpose invariably is to produce this very result. It
is intended to have an effect on the mind, and when the mind is affected as the strikers
desire, extort some concession that they know they could not otherwise obtain. It is
idle to talk about strikers being actuated by inoffensive purposes in organizing a strike.
They know and fully intend all the evil consequences that result from simultaneously
and by preconcert quitting the service of their masters. They know and fully intend
that by quitting in a body in the midst of the busiest time, that their masters will be
left without sufficent employes to carry on business, and that hope that the certainty
of financial loss resulting from their action, will compel the employer, by putting him
in mental duress, to agree to something that he would not agree to if left free to exercise
his right of volition.
Id. 223-24.
12. Id.
13. This development has been summarized thusly:
It being manifest that the purpose of employes in quitting work simultaneously was
to compel the master to do something against his will, it is not astonishing that the
common law treated the mere conspiracy or combination to quit as a criminal conspir-
acy. In criminal offenses, the law looks only at the intent with which an act is done.
The intent in striking being wrongful, it must be admitted that the common law rule
was not much out of the way, for an offense was committed as soon as an intent was
formed, and that intent was shown as soon as a conspiracy was entered into.
Id. at 227.
14. The foregoing material was extracted from F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 17-19 (1930).
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strike was not lost because of the employer's economic predomi-
nance, but because judicial power had prevailed. In Debs' own
words, "'the ranks were broken, and the strike was broken up...
not by the Army, and not by any other power, but simply and solely
by the action of the United States Courts in restraining us from
discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the employ-
ees ....
The labor injunction became an increasingly popular weapon."I
Judges were already accustomed to its use in solving labor disputes
involving railroads in receivership, and the injunction seemed to
them an appropriate method of quieting the "emergencies" born of
the increasingly organized efforts of labor. 7 In fact, the labor injunc-
tion became so popular that in many cases injunctions were issued
without any proof of improper or illegal conduct.18 The mere act of
going on strike was often sufficient to trigger judicial intervention,
under an apparent view that labor's economic coercive activity was
often enjoinable in itself. 9 Rather than seeking to ascertain that
unlawful conduct accompanied the activity sought to be enjoined,
courts guided themselves on their own notions of what was best for
the country.2 This judicial approach to labor injunctions left labor
leaders with the disability of not knowing what coercive economic
activity could legitimately be engaged in.2
Other courts, sufficiently mindful of their limitations, did not
intervene into labor disputes until they had made a finding that the
union had engaged in unlawful conduct. Unfortunately, however, in
many instances their concept of illegality was distorted. As a result,
strikes were enjoined because the interests of "society," or "com-
15. Id. at 17.
16. Thus, with hardly a dissenting voice and sustained by the authority of time-
worn maxims, the injunction asserted itself vigorously in the growing conflict of in-
dustrial forces in America at the opening of the present century. Even the judge who
had doubts silenced them by the reflection that "Every just order or rule known to
equity courts was born of some emergency, to meet some new conditions, and was,
therefore, in its time, without a precedent." A device of modest beginnings, the injunc-
tion assumed new and vast significance in a national economy in which effective
organization and collective action had attained progressive mastery.
Id. at 23-24.
17. Id.
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merce," or "consumers," or the "public" required that the union's
economic pressure be abated.2
Mr. Larry's "economic emergency" theory would reinvest the ex-
ecutive branch of government and the courts with the power to
determine that a strike was injuring the economic interests of "so-
ciety," or "commerce," or "consumers," or the "public" and, on this
basis, to enjoin such a strike for at least 80 days and take the other
steps provided for under the national emergency provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act.23 Although collective bargaining is certainly
viewed with much less disfavor today than in 1894 or 1930, can there
be any doubt that Mr. Larry's approach would result in a great deal
of disruption of the collective bargaining process?
Moreover, the implications of this concept extend beyond the
narrow interests of labor unions. If collective bargaining can be
suppressed, why should we assume that other economic endeavors
are not also vulnerable? If it is a fact, as Mr. Larry suggests, that
we are locked in an economic struggle for national survival, would
it not be appropriate under his "economic emergency" theory for the
government to impinge upon the economic decisions of corporations
as well? Could not the government, in the interests of controlling
inflation, use the injunction to influence the price a business could
pay or charge, to force a business to operate more efficiently, or to
affect the supply of goods?
B. Governmental Intervention in Steel Has Not Contributed to
Strike-Free Settlements.
In January, 1961, the United States Department of Labor pub-
lished a study entitled Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel
Industry (popularly known as the "Livernash Study") 4 which was
22. This phenomenon was described as follows:
The judicial policy in essence was one of selective suppression of organized labor's
activities whenever they trenched too heavily upon the interests of any other segment
of society. Commercial interests must not be injured by disruption of the interstate
flow of goods; consumers and unorganized laborers must not be injured by wage stan-
dardization; employers and the public at large must not be injured by expansion of
labor disputes through secondary boycotts. Save for the bargaining strike and accom-
panying picketing, very little indulgence was given to the claims of organized labor to
an institutional role in the nation's economy.
ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, THE DMLOPING LABOR LAw 12-13 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1970).
24. The Project Director of the study was E. Robert Livernash, then a Professor of Busi-
ness Administration at Harvard University. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CoLLErIvE BARGAINING IN
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commissioned by the Eisenhower Administration. Among the many
items explored in the Livernash Study was the record of governmen-
tal intervention in steel negotiations. It should be noted that until
after the momentous 1959 steel strike, labor relations in the steel
industry were exceeding turbulent25-in the ten negotiations after
1945 there were five major strikes, ranging in duration from 26 to
116 days.2"
During this same period there was a high level of governmental
intervention in steel negotiations. The Livernash Study asserts that
of the 16 different years in which steel negotiations have been
undertaken, the only years [during which intervention did not
occur] are [in the negotiation of] the original U.S. Steel-
SWOC agreement of 1937 and the negotiations of 1947, 1953,
1954, and 1955.27
Such intervention took many forms, including arbitration by the
War Labor Board during World War 11,1' mediation," fact finding,"'
seizure of the steel mills, :" and a national emergency injunction
under the Taft-Hartley Act. :2
The Livernash Study undertook an evaluation of each of these
mechanisms and also explored an alternative concept which it
called an "arsenal of weapons." ' ' With respect to the "arsenal of
weapons" approach, the Livernash Study concluded that its use
would have a damaging impact on the possibility of peaceful settle-
ments, because of a feared abuse of executive discretion resulting
in a misuse of power and favoritism. 4
THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY-A STUDY OF THE PUBLC INTEREST AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
(1961) [hereinafter cited as LIVERNASH STUDY].
25. There have been no industry wide strikes in basic steel since the 1959 strike.
26. LIVERNASH STUDY, supra note 24, at 31.
27. Id. at 205.
28. Id. at 199-200.
29. Id. at 200-02.
30. Id. at 202-03.
31. Id. at 204.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 207-27.
34. There is a general fear that it would vest in the Executive department that kind
of discretion in the exercise of power which permits of misuse . . . . [Elxperience
with charges and countercharges of misuse of power and favoritism by Government in
past steel negotiations would make it appear that this is not a fear that can be lightly
discarded. Moreover, even if there is no objective basis for the fears and charges, the
experience in steel further demonstrates that the attitudes created by this type of
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Based upon its assessment of the numerous instances of govern-
mental intervention up to and including the 1959 steel strike, the
Livernash Study concluded that if any type of intervention had
been effective, it was high-level, last-minute, informal mediation.
The report was critical of other forms of intervention. Recommenda-
tions have not been effective. They are not mandatory in any sense,
and inevitably the question of whether a given recommendation
should be accepted gives rise to new conflict. " Moreover, formal
intervention has not been helpful-each side refuses to weaken its
position in anticipation of it," and each perceives the other as being
favored by it. 7 The result is added conflict.:" The Livernash Study
concluded that "[mJinor modifications in the mechanism for han-
dling national emergency disputes hold little promise . . .,.
Our experience in the steel industry subsequent to the Livernash
Study is entirely consistent with the conclusion that collective bar-
gaining is most effective when the parties are left alone. In contrast
to the period covered by the Livernash Report which is replete with
governmental involvement and strikes, since 1959 there has been a
great deal less governmental intervention and not a single industry-
wide strike.
One can only speculate whether a lower government profile has
actually contributed to strike-free settlements. It is quite clear,
however, that in an industry which had been plagued by strikes, the
35. Id. at 9-11.
36. The anticipation of intervention modifies each party's approach to negotiation.
Neither party wishes to weaken its position if intervention is regarded as probable. The
parties behave quite differently in negotiations when they anticipate formal interven-
tion than when they do not.
Id. at 9-10.
37. In collective bargaining in steel, intervention has itself been a source of conflict.
It seldom appears even-handed to the parties. Over the years, it appears to have been
more resented by the industry than the union. The industry has objected to the wage
and price implications of intervention and has felt that on issues or principle neutrals
have more often compromised the industry position. The union in 1959 felt that the
injunction considerably favored the companies.
Id.
38. The study concluded:
With this history and these attitudes toward intervention, it is very difficult to be
optimistic with respect to the fruitfulness of any form of early intervention to facilitate
the settlement of disputes. The imposition of neutrals, as distinct from a situation in
which parties voluntarily seek the assistance of neutrals, would appear more likely to
intensify conflict than to aid in the resolution of issues.
Id.
39. Id. at 11.
1975
Duquesne ,Law Review
private parties have been able to conclude six consecutive negotia-
tions (1962, 1963, 1965, 1968, 1971 and 1974) without a strike and
without significant governmental involvement.
C. The Union's Economic Weapons Are a Vital Ingredient of
Collective Bargaining.
The Livernash Study was commissioned by a Republican admin-
istration during the gargantuan 1959 strike because of "[plublic
apprehension over the frequency, length, and effects of strikes in the
basic steel industry.....1,40 It was, therefore, a possibility that the
report would recommend limitations upon the right to strike. This
did not occur. On the contrary, the Livernash Report rejected re-
straints and asserted that strikes were a vital element in effective
collective bargaining.41 In fact, Archibald Cox and Derek Bok assert
that the strike is the "motive power thatmakes collective bargain-
ing operate," 2-a view widely held by scholars and practitioners
alike.
43
Interestingly enough, Mr. Larry acknowledges in his paper that
the union must be potent if collective bargaining is to be effective.
In his discussion of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement which
the United Steelworkers of America and the steel industry have
40. Id. at v.
41. The report stated:
Free collective bargaining necessitates the right to strike. The cost of strikes must
be kept in perspective. The freedom to strike is in our society the major deterrent to
strikes. Any effective alternative involves drastic legislative modification of free bar-
gaining and is far from having no economic costs. National defense, as previously
stated, presents a special problem for which partial operation should be most seriously
considered. Fundamentally, it should be recognized that the pressures upon the parties
to settle are substantially irresistible when a strike reaches the critical stage.
Id. at 49.
42. A. Cox & D. BOK, CAsES ON LABOR LAw 905 (6th ed. 1965).
In the final analysis collective bargaining works as a method of fixing terms and
conditions of employment only because there comes a time when both sides conclude
that the risks of losses through a strike are so great the compromise is cheaper than
economic battle. And when one side or both miscalculate and conclude that the risks
are worth running and a strike occurs, it is settled only when each side is convinced
that continuing the struggle will cost more than acceptance of the terms the other
offers.
Id.
43. See, e.g., Aaron, Collective Bargaining Where Strikes Are not Tolerated, in
COLLEcrIvE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE 70's? 130 (Rowan ed. 1972); ABA LABOR RELATIONs
SECTION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 517 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
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pioneered, he includes the following insightful acknowledgment of
the necessity that mutual power and mutual detriment be incorpo-
rated in any effective collective bargaining system:
Each party. . . knew the pains of returning to earlier patterns;
each knew that the other could force that return if the negotia-
tions were not sufficiently meaningful. . . . In exchange for
certain precommitments, the parties substituted the right to
arbitration for the right to resort to strike or lockout ...
The agreement involved real risks to the interests of both
parties, and it was this fact they relied upon to prod them into
reaching agreement by collective bargaining on their own. The
right to force arbitration presents different risks from the right
to force a strike or lockout, but, nevertheless, very real
risks. . . . I can personally testify that the last three nights
were just as sleepless as if the parties had been racing a dead-
line for a strike or lockout.4
One might ask why, if the right to strike is such a vital factor, did
the union agree to substitute interest arbitration for the right to
strike in the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA). Mr.
Larry has provided part of the answer to this question. Let me
elaborate. The union did not forfeit its right to strike as would occur
under Mr. Larry's "economic emergency" theory whenever a court
should choose to issue an injunction. Rather, the union temporarily
traded one economic weapon (the right to strike) for another (inter-
est arbitration).
In the circumstances which exist in the steel industry it is the
union's judgment that interest arbitration is at least as potent as the
strike threat. The union does not hold this view with respect to the
other thousands of employers with whom it bargains; hence, the
ENA has not been offered to those employers. It may well be that
the union will conclude at some future time that in the steel indus-
try the strike would be a more meaningful weapon than interest
arbitration. In such event, the union is free in subsequent negotia-
tions to reject the ENA and to revert to the strike weapon.
44. Larry, supra note 1, at 219 (footnote omitted). According to a knowledgeable observer
of the steel scene, a former chief executive of Republic Steel Corporation, Charles M. White,
expressed similar sentiments in a much more colorful and succinct fashion: "If they think
we're wrong, they strike us. See? That's the way things should work. It's a hell of a good
way.'" G. McMAus, THE INSIDE STORY OF STEEL WAGES AND PRIcES 1959-1967, at 18 (1967).
1975
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It is quite obvious, I believe, and has been acknowledged by steel
industry spokesmen, that the ENA and its many special benefits45
for steelworkers could not have been attained in the absence of a
meaningful strike threat.46 By the same token, the imminent avail-
ability of the strike weapon is, as Mr. Larry concedes, a further
inducement for the industry to make the ENA work. In a sense,
then, the ENA combines the latent pressures of the right to strike
with the active pressures of interest arbitration.
D. Collective Bargaining Is Not the Cause of the Nation's Eco-
nomic Ills.
Mr. Larry has presented an excellent summary of the reasons for
our current economic plight. 7 He lists (1) the delayed impact of
governmental deficits incurred during the Vietnam conflict, (2) the
cumulative effect of many years during which exchange rates were
misaligned, (3) the result of long-term distortions in American con-
suming patterns, (4) the world-wide energy problem, and (5) the
grain transactions. It is significant that he does not include wage
costs on his list.
Mr. Larry's thesis is not that wage costs are fueling inflation but
that the efforts of unions to cope with inflation are having a
"ratchet" effect.4" In other words, he suggests that if workers are
fortunate enough to keep pace with inflation-an endeavor which
has not succeeded in recent years 4 -the resulting increases in wage
costs impose further pressures on the economy, if only by slowing
the rate at which inflation decelerates.
On the basis of this same logic a meager wage increase which
recovers but a fraction of the erosive value of inflation would also
have an upward ratcheting effect and would thus presumably be
objectionable, though less so than a settlement which paces infla-
tion.
The "ratchet" theory might make some sense if wage costs had
been a principal cause of the inflation, if all other segments of the
45. One of the special benefits for steelworkers is a right to strike which had not, as a
practical matter, previously existed. Under the ENA the employees of a given plant can,
subject to certain procedural requirements, strike their plant in furtherance of their local
issue negotiations. This innovation has been very effective.
46. ABA LABOR RELATIONS SEcrION, PROCEEDINGS 63-65 (1973).
47. Larry, supra note 1, at 216.
48. Id.
49. See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
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economy were required to assume a proportionate share of the re-
sponsibility for battling inflation, and if wage earners could afford
to make the necessary sacrifice. It is clear, however, that none of
these conditions are operative.
Looking first at workers' earnings we see that during the period
from 1961 through 1967 the economy was relatively quiescent. The
average annual increase in the consumer price index (CPI) during
this period was 1.8%.50 Then, in 1968 we began to experience the first
signs of inflation when the CPI increased 4.6%. This continued dur-
ing 1969 (6.2% increase), 1970 (5.2% increase) and the first half of
1971 (2.2% increase, an annual rate of 4.4%). On August 15, 1971 a
three month wage freeze was invoked, and this was followed by the
various "phases" of the Nixon control program.5' As a consequence,
the curve of inflation flattened considerably during the latter half
of 1971 (1.3% increase, an annual rate of 2.6%) and during 1972
(3.7% increase). Then in 1973 and 1974 inflation soared with annual
CPI increases of 9.4% and 12.2% (approximately) respectively.
Hence, the current inflation extends from the beginning of 1968
to date and can be charted as follows:
Period Average Annual Rate of Inflation
1968 to mid-1971 5.2%
Mid-1971 through 1972 3.3%
1973 and 1974 10.8%
We turn now to the wage picture. The following chart reflects the
"real net spendable weekly earnings" 2 of non-agricultural produc-
50. This percentage and those which follow were taken from or computed on the basis of
Consumer Price Index figures set forth in BNA LAB. REL. REP., EXPEDrrER LRX 164-74b
(1975).
51. For a brief summary of the Nixon control era see id. at 293-94. Controls formally ended
on June 30, 1974. BNA LAB. REL. REP., WAGE & SALARY CONTROLS 501:101-04 (1974).
52. "Real net spendable weekly earnings" are defined and explained in The Economic
Report of the President, Transmitted to Congress, Feb. 1974, at 73-75. See also Defina, Labor
and the Economy in 1974, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Jan. 1975, at 3.
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tion or non-supervisory employees and the increases in the con-
sumer price index for the years since 1968.13
Year (Annual Real Spendable Percentage In- Percentage
Unless Other- Net Earnings crease/(Decrease) Increase in
wise Stated) (1967 Dollars) in Real Spendable Consumer
Net Earnings Price Index
1968 91.44 4.6%
1969 91.07 (0.4%) 6.2%
1970 89.95 (1.2%) 5.2%
1971 (July) 92.72 3.1% 2.2% (half year)
1971 (Dec.) 93.41 0.7% 1.3% (half year)
1972 96.40 3.2% 3.7%
1973 95.08 (1.4%) 9.4%
1974 (Dec.) 89.12 (6.3%) 12.2%
These figures establish several points. First, there is a remarkable
correlation between increased inflation and reduced real earnings.
When the consumer price index moves up rapidly, real earnings
drop abruptly. When the consumer price index increases slowly, real
earnings will remain relatively constant or will increase moderately.
Secondly, real earnings are considerably lower today than they were
in 1968 or at any time subsequent to 1968.11 Indeed, at the end of
1974 real earnings were 7.5% lower than in 1972. Thirdly, the level
of real earnings is so low that wage earners simply cannot be ex-
pected to absorb inflation. In the interests of subsistence, they
should, at a minimum, be entitled to keep pace with inflation, and
though this is not the appropriate forum for a discussion of incomes
policy, continued social and economic progress dictates that wage
earners receive an increasing share of the total national income.
In view of these statistics it is clear that wage costs did not cause
inflation. On the contrary, wages have been seriously eroded by
inflation. If it were otherwise valid, the "ratchet" theory simply
cannot be justified when we are dealing with wage earners whose
average spendable income is less than $90.00 per week and who are
currently falling behind at a rate in excess of 6% annually.
53. The earnings data reflected on the chart was extracted from The Economic Report of
the President, Feb. 1974, at 285; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINEss No.
5-16 (Jan. 1975); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS No. 5-15 (Feb. 1972).
54. In fact, if we trace real spendable net earnings back to the years prior to those listed
on the foregoing chart, we find that such earnings are lower today than during any year since
1964.
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Collective Bargaining in Perspective
Collective bargaining always has been and probably always will
be attacked as a vehicle of economic dislocation. Because of such
agitation during the 1950's the Livernash group addressed this ques-
tion in its study of collective bargaining in the steel industry.55 The
Livernash report stated that "the economic terms of steel settle-
ments [will be studied] to assess their impact upon wages and
prices in the economy.
56
The findings with respect to this question were as follows:
(1) That if steel were hypothetically removed from the
post-war collective bargaining environment wage and other set-
tlement terms in the economy would not have been modified
to any great extent;
(2) That increases in employment costs would not have had
a significant impact different from that which actually took
place;
(3) That price increases in steel, no matter what the reason,
have not had any significant impact on general price levels. 57
Aside from its assertion that collective bargaining settlements in
steel were of little overall significance, the Livernash Study also
concluded that the "economic impact of strikes on the economy are
usually seriously exaggerated."58 With specific reference to strikes in
the steel industry, the report found that their "actual adverse eco-
nomic effects . . . have usually been overestimated" and that they
have had "little measurable impact." 59
As shown above, it would be a gross mistake to tinker with collec-
tive bargaining even if it were one of the many causes of our current
55. LIVERNASH STUDY, supra note 24.
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 14-15. The study went on to conclude:
In summary: (1) Collective bargaining settlements in steel have not been a predomi-
nant independent influence in establishing or modifying wage trends in the economy;
(2) the wage and price effects of steel settlements, and industry decisions with respect
to price policy, when realistically interpreted, have had a minimal independent effect
upon the price level in the econdmy; (3) the increasingly stringent compulsions of
competition provide important protection for steel users; and (4) a major problem
confronting the parties in collective bargaining is to adjust to the increasingly competi-
tive environment in a manner best suited to protect their mutual longer-term interests.
Id. at 14-15.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Id. at 9. These conclusions are shared by Charles Gregory who has asserted that
"[wihile all strikes unquestionably cause economic loss and are wasteful, most of them do
not have any perceptible effect on the general community." C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw
501-02 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
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inflation. In view of the fact that it demonstrably is not, and consid-
ering the wage losses suffered by workers in recent years, these
specious efforts to tie inflation to collective bargaining should cease.
There are a multitude of programs that should be pursued instead
of increasing the pressure upon wage earners. For example, waste
and inefficiency should be attacked at all levels of government and
business; loose management practices should be remedied; the pric-
ing policies and profit picture of American business should be scru-
tinized; business and government should resolve, finally, to pursue
energy, natural resource and defense policies which serve the public
interest; our national transportation crisis should be ad-
dressed-and solved; and, at long last, our tax laws should be com-
pletely reformed to the end that favors and loopholes will be elimi-
nated and the burdens of society will be distributed in a just and
equitable way.
II. THE PROPOSAL TO INHIBIT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY STRIPPING
UNIONS OF THEIR "MONOPOLY POWER"
Though Mr. Larry's principal thrust is devoted to his "economic
emergency" proposal, he touches on several other ideas. One of
these is to eliminate the "monopoly power" of unions. He does not
define "monopoly power," but there is some indication in his paper
that the term relates to the size of unions and to their right to
organize and bargain on broader than a single plant basis.
If this is what Mr. Larry is suggesting, there are so many objec-
tions that an adequate response would exceed the scope of this
presentation. Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Larry has simply
mentioned the subject and made no effort to develop it, we would
be speculating until we know the full dimensions of his thinking.
However, pending such elaboration, I offer the following assorted
reactions.
Shibboleths such as "monopoly power" are most unfortunate.
Their effect is to ignite the passions without illuminating the issues.
Every observer or practitioner of labor relations has probably formu-
lated his or her own empirical judgment concerning the question of
union strength and collective bargaining. For example, Archibald
Cox and Derek Bok have argued that, since our national labor policy
rests on the conviction that wages should generally be set through
the collective bargaining process, collective bargaining "ac-
cepts-indeed . .. presupposes-the existence of strong labor
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unions, [and] their existence and continuance are facts on which
any solution of national emergency strikes must be predicated.""''
The value of such empirical judgments on a question such as
union power is admittedly questionable. However, it is my firm
conviction that the realities of the collective bargaining process sup-
port the Cox-Bok conclusion that strong unions are an implicit part
of the process. I feel that the process improves in direct relationship
to union strength.
An example of this is found in Mr. Larry's paper. In connection
with his ultimate conclusion that reforms must come from within
the collective bargaining system, he points to the development of
the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) by the United
Steelworkers of America and the steel industry and observes that
the ENA was challenged in the courts."' Mr. Larry might also have
mentioned that the challenge was launched by union members who
were making a determined effort to turn the ENA to their political
advantage.
Could a weak union have pioneered an ENA concept? The answer
is obvious. The ENA is a product of the strength of the United
Steelworkers of America. It was the union's strength and persistence
in collective bargaining that ultimately brought the steel industry
to the point where it would bargain in a fair and constructive fash-
ion. And, it was because of the union's strength that its leadership
could take a step that was bold and certain to engender some politi-
cal reaction. The simple truth is that strength produces responsibil-
60. A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 904 (9th ed. 1965).
At the present time our national labor policy is predicated on the belief that the price
of labor should be fixed by collective bargaining save in those periods when wage
stabilization measures are required to combat inflationary pressures. The employees,
acting as a group through their union leaders, negotiate with their employer (or a
number of employers) in an effort to arrive at the terms on which the employees will
sell and the employer will buy the workers' services. The process resembles any nego-
tiation in most respects but it differs critically in others. Three characteristics of
collective bargaining seem especially important.
The first is that collective bargaining accepts - indeed it presupposes - the exist-
ence of strong labor unions. Strong unions not only perform useful functions in modem
society; they also aid the men who are workers to realize legitimate human aspirations.
But regardless of the desirability of strong unions, their existence and continuance are
facts on which any solution of national emergency strikes must be predicated.
Id. at 903-04. See also Shils, Union Fragmentation: A Major Cause of Transportation Labor
Crises, in CoLLECnvE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? 236 (Rowan ed. 1972). But see C.
GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 497-523 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
61. Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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ity and performance, while weakness results in chaos and disorder.
Finally, there is an interesting inconsistency between Mr. Larry's
position on union power and another of his reform measures. In
footnote 9 of his paper he suggests that it is inconsistent with good
faith bargaining for unions to let their members ratify contracts
negotiated by the union. When the issue arises in this context, Mr.
Larry becomes an advocate of union power.
Ifl. CONCLUSION
Mention is made in Mr. Larry's paper of other schemes which
would impair the collective bargaining process. These include (1)
fiscal, monetary and employment policies which would increase
unemployment and act "as an economic brake upon employees'
aspirations and union power,"" (2). denial of welfare benefits to
strikers, and (3) stricter judicial attitudes toward picketing and
strike conduct.
Among those segments of the business community which continue
to resist unionism, these schemes apparently have considerable pop-
ularity. They bespeak an attitude which is entirely antagonistic to
collective bargaining and which, I trust, is not widely held.
I am confident that Mr. Larry does not embrace these concepts.
His record is not consistent with their philosophy. He is and always
has been a skilled practitioner of the process of collective bargain-
ing. Though he has expressed some misgivings about the current
shape of the process, and has advocated some changes with which I
vigorously disagree, I am satisfied that our differences fall within
the permissible limits of perspective and that the prospects for con-
tinued success in steel bargaining are encouraging.
62. Larry, supra note 1, at 212.
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